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PUBLISHED BOOK CHAPTER: 
 
Demir,  Ipek  (2015)  'Battlespace  Diaspora:  How  the  Kurds  of  Turkey  Revive, 
Construct and Translate the Kurdish Struggle in London',  in Christou, Anastasia 
and  Mavroudi,  Elizabeth  (eds.)  Dismantling  Diasporas:  Rethinking  the 
Geographies  of  Diasporic  Identity,  Connection  and  Development  (Abingdon: 
Routledge), pp. 71‐84. 
 
This chapter examines the Kurdish diaspora's ethno-political battles for identity. 
Much work on the Kurdish diaspora has been carried out in relation to Kurds on the 
continent and has focused on the Kurds' antagonistic relationship with Turkey, 
examining Kurds' desire for the recognition of their ethnic identity and struggle, and 
their associated anti-Turkey mobilisation and activities. For example Demir (2012), 
Griffiths (2000), Wahlbeck (1998) have identified the ways in which Kurdish politics 
have featured in the lives and discourses of Kurds in the UK since the late 1980s. 
Eccarius-Kelly (2002) has provided a fascinating exposition of legislative pressures 
and political lobbying of Kurds in Germany to the European Parliament and the 
Council of Europe. Others, for example, Eliassi (2013) Leggewie (1996); Lyon and 
Uarer (2001), ¯stergaard-Nielsen (2001) and Van Bruinessen (1998) have examined 
in detail the ways in which Kurdish diasporic activism has an impact on the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey and in Europe. Whilst acknowledging the importance of 
diasporic Kurds' mobilisation activities, this chapter will examine the translational 
activities of Kurds in London by presenting detailed ethnographic data and analysis 
on the various ways in which diasporic Kurds translate their suffering and rebellion to 
British audiences. The chapter will discuss how this translation involves the need to 
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undertake Ôethno-political tuitionÕ; the difficulties of making the battle ÔpalatableÕ for 
British audiences; the Ôethnic entrepreneurial labouringÕ in which Kurds engage as 
well as how the translation of Kurdish culture, struggle and rebellion is central for the 
transnational battles of Kurds. 
 
Kurds from Turkey1 make up a sizeable proportion of north LondonÕs ethnic minority 
population. In fact it is thought that many who are regarded as ÔTurksÕ in London are 
of Kurdish origin,2 having arrived in the UK as refugees from the late 1980s onwards. 
Most originate from Maraş, Elbistan, Malatya and Sivas (Griffiths, 2002; Wahlbeck, 
1998). The movement of Kurds from Turkey has been brought about by the 
suppression of their cultural and linguistic rights in Turkey, their forceful 
displacement from Kurdish villages, as well as their facing multiple forms of 
economic deprivation and social exclusion in Turkey (see for example, Bayir, 2013; 
Houston, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2010 and 2012; Saraoğlu, 2010; 
Zeydanlõoğlu, 2012). Kurds have been seeking asylum in the UK since the 1980s. 
Most Kurds in London are Alevis, a minority religious sect in Turkey (Demir, 2012). 
Alevis - whether they are Kurdish or Turkish - have faced persecution in Turkey, for 
example, as demonstrated by the events of ÔMadõmakÕ in Sivas in 1993 and Istanbul 
Gazi in 1995. Whilst Sunni Turks are the dominant group in Turkey (both 
numerically and culturally), in London Alevi Kurds constitute the majority of those 
from Turkey. 
                                                        
1
 Throughout this article when I refer to ÔKurdsÕ, I mean Kurds from Turkey. 
2
 The total number of Kurds from Turkey in the UK is a rough estimation. It is thought to be between 
100.000 and 180.000. The Home Office only records the country of origin of asylum seekers, but not 
their ethnicity. The 2011 census in the UK, on the other hand, is thought to underestimate their 
numbers. This is due to a mixture of reasons. For example new migrants can be reluctant to complete 
the census or have informal living and work arrangements and thus can fall through the gaps. Also, 
Kurds from Turkey can be reluctant to define themselves as ÔKurdishÕ for various historical and social 
reasons, especially due to what has been regarded as ÔTurkificationÕ policies in Turkey. 
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Kurds are now a considerable component of multicultural North London, not only in 
terms of size but also in terms of their political voice and activism. In Haringey they 
run many community organisations, off-licences, catering businesses and shops. They 
are politically active and increasingly involved in the cultural, social and political life 
of North London (Enneli, Modood, Bradley, 2005; Pattison and Tavsanoglu, 2002). 
Since 2006 they have been successful in electing councillors for Hackney, Haringey 
and Enfield. As Hassanpour and Mojab state, the Kurds of Turkey, in comparison 
with Kurds from elsewhere, for example, Ôhave maintained a hegemonic presence in 
diaspora politicsÕ (2004, p. 222). In recent years such activism has expanded and 
widened, and increasingly involves a battle with Turkey via civic and cultural 
activism and recognition in Europe. Kurds have created a vibrant diasporic space in 
Europe and have engaged in various types of transnational activities, for example, via 
social and economic remittances aimed at Kurdish civil society and parties in Turkey 
and via broadcasting to Turkey from Kurdish satellite channels based in Europe 
(Ayata, 2008, 2011; Gunes, 2012). Their transnational networks are also sustained 
through the grounded everyday links and contacts they form and continue to form, 
spanning various EU countries and Turkey. As highlighted by Soguk (2008, p.176), 
they are becoming increasingly ÔEuroversalÕ. My aim in this chapter is to examine 
how politicised diasporic Kurds in London have built and crafted a battlespace where 
they tell a story of Kurdishness, especially Kurdish suffering and uprising which 
challenges and undoes the way in which the Kurdish question is told both in Turkey 
and by Turkey to the outside world. In particular, I will focus on the ways in which 
this battlespace is brokered and translated to British audiences by diasporic Kurdish 
leaders and elites.  
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Methods 
In order to examine the diasporic battles and translation of Kurds, the research 
employed an ethnographic approach encompassing two qualitative methods:  one-to-
one, semi-structured interviews were conducted and key public meetings, gatherings, 
political demonstrations and cultural festivals were observed.  I conducted in-depth 
interviews with 90 ÔKurdish brokersÕ who revive, construct and maintain a diasporic 
battlespace in London and who thus translate Kurdish suffering and uprising to 
British audiences. Kurdish brokers comprise the authoritative Kurdish actors, in 
particular the Kurdish leaders of community organisations, and the leading and elite 
members of the Kurdish community in London. The ÔKurdish leaders of community 
organisationsÕ are Kurds who formally run, manage and direct the community 
organisations, including serving on boards, management committees, sub-committees 
or who act in an advisory role. The Ôleading and elite members of the Kurdish 
communityÕ, for the purposes of this research, are defined as individuals who are 
mobilised, politicised and influential, but who do not run or lead a Kurdish 
organisation in a formal capacity.  
 
There are a significant number of influential Kurdish leaders who are not formally 
associated with a Kurdish organisation yet are prominent and mobilised, mostly due 
to their educated, elite, social positioning or due to the political allegiances and links 
brought from home. I interviewed Kurds from organisations with a close and explicit 
link with the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, for example the Kurdish Community Centre 
(KCC) in Haringey, and the Kurdish and Turkish Community Centre (Halkevi). 
However, there are many diasporic organisations in London with a Kurdish leadership 
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and a significant Kurdish constituency, albeit many without ÔKurdishÕ in the title of 
their community associations. Since brokerage is also carried out by their leadership 
and by those who frequent such associations, interviews with them were carried out. 
The sample of 90 includes both the leaders and the leading members of the 
community.  
 
Interviews were continued until saturation was reached. I attempted to achieve a 
balanced sample in terms of age, place of origin in Turkey, and gender. Even though 
senior heads of the community organisations are usually male, there are prominent 
female Kurds in management committees, sub-committees, or serving in an advisory 
or consultative role. In addition to ensuring female leaders were included in the 
sample, special attention was paid to interviewing Kurdish leaders from different 
backgrounds and with varying political stances. I also attended numerous community 
meetings. I undertook observations during various demonstrations, public meetings, 
gatherings, and festivals in which the Kurdish community and organisations 
participate. As much time as possible was spent participating in the activities of the 
community to get a full sense of their diasporic brokerage and translational activities.  
 
Battlespace Diaspora 
 
The political struggles and disputes of Kurds with Turkey have come to play a central 
role in the identity formation and everyday lives of Kurds in London (Griffiths, 2002; 
Wahlbeck, 1998). Since the late 1980s, Kurds in London have been engaged in a 
rigorous battle with their country of origin, Turkey. The Kurdish Ôethno-political 
entrepreneursÕ have been heavily involved in keeping the battle alive. There is no 
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question, however, that this battle has been sustained by TurkeyÕs uncompromising 
attitude to the Kurdish question. The Ôfetishism of the military solutionÕ to the 
Kurdish question in Turkey has contributed to the stepping up of the diasporic battle 
and hence the galvanising of the Kurdish diaspora (Demir, 2014).  
 
The battles undertaken by the Kurdish diaspora are aimed at creating an alternative 
political sphere, alternative to the way in which the Kurdish question is constructed in 
Turkey. I call this alternative political space that diasporas construct Ôbattlespace 
diasporaÕ. It is a space Ôvictim diasporasÕ (Cohen, 1997), who have been suppressed 
in their country of origin, create as they carry out their identity and political battles in 
the host country. Battlespace diaspora is a type of Ôdiaspora spaceÕ. The latter has 
been discussed in the literature. It refers to a political and cultural space where 
belonging ties and identities brought from home are crafted as well as challenged 
(Brah, 1996). Adamson (2002) also discusses the mobilisation activities of 
transnational communities and refers to the sites they create as a diasporic Ôpolitical 
spaceÕ whilst Mavroudi (2008) has examined the Ôinformal political spacesÕ diasporic 
Palestinians in Athens, Greece have created. The battlespace diaspora I refer to is a 
type of diasporic space in that it is aimed at challenging the official construction of 
the Kurdish issue by Turkey and crafting new identities and stories around 
Kurdishness. It is thus a dynamic and situated place, responsive to the events and 
changes in Turkey and contingent upon KurdsÕ reception by the host community. 
However, since galvanising support and communicating their suffering and uprising 
are essential, and their battling is often intense, resilient and radical, their political 
mobilisation space is better described as a battlespace. The Kurdish community 
(alongside, for example, Palestinians and Tamils) are an exemplary case of a 
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diasporic group who has revived, constructed and translated their rebellion and 
struggle whilst living in diasporic neighbourhoods of European cities (Baser and 
Swaim, 2011; Eccarius-Kelly, 2002).  
 
The focus of my ethnographic research, namely the Kurds of London, have carried on 
their identity battle in varying degrees of intensity with the Turkish state. This has, 
since the late 1980s, been actualised through multiple methods and needs to be 
understood as a spectrum. At one end of this spectrum one can find examples such as 
expressing Kurdish ethnic and cultural identity through giving Kurdish (rather than 
Muslim or Turkish) names to oneÕs children, or ensuring there are Kurdish television 
satellite channels (almost always in addition to Turkish mainstream ones) at home or 
in community centres. The other end of the spectrum can involve recruiting support 
for the Kurdistan WorkersÕ Party (PKK)3 by promoting pro-PKK activities and 
demonstrations, collecting money, and even joining the PKK guerrilla fight in 
Turkey. As some of my interviewees indicated, a number of second generation Kurds 
who were born or who were brought up in London have moved back and joined the 
guerrilla warfare in Turkey: ÔThe PKK has a strong bearing on Kurds in London as it 
does in the rest of Europe. Some of our young men have also gone to fight the 
Turkish army.Õ Another highlighted: ÔKurds will fight the Turkish state even from 
London. We will not run out of guerrillas.Õ  
 
As my research reveals, battling goes beyond what has been described above. The 
ways in which Kurdish suffering and uprising are translated to the British audiences 
are now a central aspect of the battlespace diaspora Kurds create and maintain. In the 
                                                        
3 The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the European Union and the United States. 
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rest of the chapter, I will discuss the difficulties and pains associated with the 
translation of Kurdish culture, struggle and rebellion by making the insights gained 
from translation studies central to the study of diasporic identity battles. 
 
Diasporas and Translation 
 
Diasporas have traditionally been placed within two spheres, namely the homeland 
and the host community. The ways in which the battles from home are picked up, 
salvaged and translated to the host community have not typically been studied. How 
an ethno-political identity is revived and translated in diaspora allows one to explore, 
as I will below, the various difficulties diasporas face, as well as the various strategies 
and creative coping mechanisms they develop when ÔhomeÕ and ÔawayÕ meet or clash 
via translation.  
 
Examining the translational political activities of diasporas is extremely fruitful, both 
in terms of enabling us to collect data which would otherwise go amiss about a 
particular diaspora, but also in terms of opening up new perspectives and avenues in 
diaspora studies in general. For example, it can allow us to examine how diasporas 
strategically exclude certain stories about their history and identity whilst highlighting 
certain other cultural and personal memories, solidarities, histories and practices in 
their translations. It can also do this by recognising that such omissions and additions 
are not always strategic but at times unintentional, contingent and inadvertent and at 
times depends on the communityÕs knowledge of, and reception by, the host 
community. As those who have led and defended the Ôcultural turnÕ in translation 
studies have argued, translation is in fact always a site of Ôgain and discoveryÕ 
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(Bassnett and Trivedi, 1994, p. 4). It is at the same time a site of erasure and exclusion 
(Bielsa, 2010). This is because there is never full and accurate translation. Studying 
what diasporas choose to translate, therefore, can tell us what a particular diasporic 
community prioritises, as well as what they deem as unimportant, irrelevant or 
perhaps shameful and thus exclude or leave out in their translations.  
 
Secondly, and following on from the above point, translation is always a form of 
ÔrewritingÕ (Lefevere, 1992). Translations of diasporas, including the Kurdish, need to 
be understood as forms of rewriting and transformation rather than as one trying to 
create equivalences with identities formed at home. Thirdly, translation studies centre 
our attention on audiences. It can reveal if different translations are put forward for 
different audiences, albeit by the very same diasporic group. In particular, studying 
the translational activities of diasporic groups can reveal the extent to which different 
kinds of ethno-political identity are conveyed to different audiences, and for what 
purposes. Fourthly, shedding light on the ways in which diasporic brokers Ôkeep a lidÕ 
on the diasporic identity that is salvaged and translated (e.g. the silencing of 
ÔunsuitableÕ groups and demands, whilst encouraging and even inciting some others 
to speak) is yet another avenue translation can open for diaspora studies. Last but not 
least, how well diasporas relate to, and associate with, the host community can be 
recovered through an examination of how they choose to translate the home, 
especially what they deem as significant, and how, if at all, they can make their 
stories ÔpalatableÕ to the host community. 
 
Studying translational activities of diasporas means that one does not overlook the 
difficulties of translating across spatial and cultural boundaries, including 
 10 
misunderstandings and missed-understandings. There are always losses and gains in 
translation, including in the salvaging and translation of an ethno-political identity 
and culture in diaspora. Below I will focus on some of these possible insights which a 
focus on ÔtranslationÕ can bring to the study of diasporas by discussing the difficulties 
the Kurdish brokers face, as well as the various coping mechanisms they employ, 
when they translate the Kurdish struggle and rebellion to British audiences. 
 
Translating Kurdish Battling in Diaspora 
 
The Kurds of London are an invisible diasporic community, not only in academic 
debates on immigration and diasporas, but also in public debates in the UK. Despite 
their dynamism and presence politically and socially, and despite the intense cultural 
and identity struggles they are involved in, they remain largely invisible (King et al., 
2008). Due to this invisibility, they have had to put a lot of effort into making 
Kurdishness visible to the British, that is ensuring that they translate Kurdish identity, 
culture, battles and suffering. This translation is critical if the invisibility they face is 
to be overcome. As one of my interviewees put it: ÔThe associations in London had 
their face turned towards Turkey. They were obsessed with politics in Turkey. We are 
now shaking off this attitude and gradually turning our face to Britain. But we need to 
do much more to explain our struggle to the world.Õ  
 
Salvaging and translation of an identity, especially displaying a politically united 
identity for purposes of resistance and struggle, are never easy or effortless. They 
require negotiation and rendering of history and identity, the reshaping and re-telling 
of collective memory, ethnic gate-keeping, Ôstrategies of inclusion and exclusionÕ 
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(Demir, 2011) as well as thinking about audiences, that is whom to say what and, 
perhaps more importantly, whom not to say what. It should come as no surprise that if 
an ethno-political identity was oppressed and subject to policies of erasure (e.g. 
policies of Turkification), reviving, salvaging and translating it will require a lot more 
effort and labouring. There is also the added problem that the translation of Kurdish 
suffering and rebellion are occurring in the context of increasing compassion fatigue 
whereby receptive audiences are difficult to find, never mind to enrol as supporters.  
 
ÔEthno-Political TuitionÕ 
 
The Kurdish leaders I interviewed in London, on the whole, have argued that the 
diasporic battle they are engaged in needs to move beyond the Kurdish community 
and neighbourhoods (Haringey, Dalston), and what one interviewee defined as Ôour 
insular struggle with TurkeyÕ.  They underlined how important it was to be able to 
translate effectively their struggle to the British audiences and authorities. This has 
come about as a result of two important changes. First, the community, over time, has 
recognised the importance of being able to tell the Kurdish struggle and suffering to 
their host community, akin to other communities such as the Tamil. Secondly, 
Kurdish brokers, over the years, have come to understand Britain and the British 
better. They have more comprehensive knowledge of Britain, and thus, better 
knowledge of how to present the Kurdish struggle to British audiences. Consequently, 
not only have the brokersÕ attitudinal and dispositional orientations changed and their 
willingness to engage with the host community on Kurdish issues intensified, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, their practices and competencies of being able to 
engage and translate. One interviewee put it succinctly: ÔAt community centres few 
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people understand the British or do things with the British. But now people like us are 
bursting the bubble.Õ4  
 
This has had the impact of getting the Kurdish diaspora to think about what kind of a 
battle one is to have and who exactly the audience for their battle should be. It has 
been pushing the community to think about their strategies for the most effective 
battling with Turkey in London. My findings clearly indicate that the Kurdish 
community has increasingly become proactive in their engagement with the British 
authorities and ÔsympatheticÕ, mostly left-wing, political movements and actors in the 
UK. This has also been intensified by the recognition that their host community (the 
UK) is relatively ignorant about the struggles of Kurds, making the translation of their 
rebellion and struggle to the British all the more critical. Kurdish brokers state that 
they have realised that they need to move from ÔHaringeyÕ to ÔTrafalgar SquareÕ, as 
clearly identified by many of my participants. For example: 
 
In the past we used to march in Haringey, do demonstrations in Green Lanes, go 
to a talk at the Kurdish [the KCC] and then head back to our homes. We now 
want to occupy central London. We want to fill Trafalgar Square. (Female, 30) 
 
We now know we need to engage the British and other immigrant communities, 
not just talk amongst ourselves. (Male, 28) 
                                                        
4 The category ÔBritishÕ emerges from the informantsÕ use of this term and is mainly associated with 
Ôwhite EnglishÕ, especially those who hold positions of power and authority. As was previously 
identified, Ôus and themÕ divisions in London exist between Kurds and Turks (those politically 
sympathetic to Kurdish sensitivities) on the one hand and ÔwhitesÕ on the other (Demir 2012: 822). 
However a more heterogeneous and multicultural understanding of Britishness exists in the form of 
ÔLondonersÕ amongst the newer generations. 
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We are now carrying banners and chanting [in demonstrations] in English as 
well as Kurdish and Turkish. We want the English to hear us, and recognise our 
concerns. (Female, 33) 
 
Dragging [Kurdish] people to central London is not always easy but we are 
doing it. WeÕre moving from Haringey to Trafalgar Square. (Male, 36) 
 
This, they argue, is fuelled primarily by the relative lack of knowledge of Kurdish 
culture and suffering, and the prioritisation of Turkishness over Kurdishness, for 
example, the classification of Kurds from Turkey as ÔTurksÕ by the British authorities 
(King et al., 2008). As a result, Kurdish diasporic battling has had to engage in what I 
call Ôethno-political tuitionÕ. Kurdish brokers, in their daily, professional or political 
engagements constantly provide explanations of who Kurds are, why they now live in 
the UK, the history of their struggle to the British public, authorities, friends, teachers, 
as well as the citizens of other countries they meet in London. This ethno-political 
tuition, however, requires a lot of labouring. It is not an easy task. It can be a painful, 
or even a cumbersome, experience to explain centuries-old ethno-political battles, 
suffering and rebellion in a few words to a British person you meet at a party or at the 
work place next to the coffee machine. It can create a lot of emotional turmoil (see, 
for example Christou, 2011). The interview excerpt with Rakibe (pseudonym, female, 
33) is typical of what the participants said on this issue: 
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Rakibe: When a British person asks where I am from, I usually say ÔI am from 
Turkey but that I am a Kurd from TurkeyÕ. I am always careful not to just say ÔI 
am from TurkeyÕ.  
 
Interviewer: You are careful becauseÉ? 
 
Rakibe: I want them to know that I am not Turkish. I want them to know that I 
am Kurdish. If I only say that I am Kurdish they think I am a Kurd from Iraq. I 
always make an effort to explain that there are millions of Kurds in Turkey. 
And in Haringey (laughsÉ).  
 
Interviewer: Do they not already know? 
 
Rakibe: If they are from North London and if they are political they know about 
Kurds and our struggles. But if they are not, they usually have no idea. Then 
they ask me various other questions. Who are Kurds? Are Kurds different to 
Turks? Why donÕt Kurds have their own country? Why donÕt you speak 
Kurdish? 
 
Interviewer: So, what do you say to them? 
 
Rakibe: I always tell them that we have our own Kurdish language but it was 
banned and we had to speak Turkish. I tell them where Kurdistan is, and the 
history of Kurdistan, how our land was divided up [by imperial powers] and 
given to other countries. I tell them that we are the biggest nation without a 
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state. I tell them the suffering and torture Kurdish people faced when they 
rebelled. 
 
Interviewer: What do you want them to remember at the end of that 
conversation? 
 
Rakibe: I want them to learn about my people, not just the suffering but also the 
rebellion we put up. I have nothing against Turkish people but I want Brits to 
know we were denied basic human rights and were subjected to assimilation in 
Turkey. 
 
Making it ÔPalatableÕ to the British 
 
Many Kurdish brokers stated in the interviews that this ethno-political tuition required 
what might be called Ôethnic entrepreneurial labouringÕ. It involves raising the interest 
of non-Kurds in the battle, involving them, educating them, perhaps falling short of 
enrolling5 them. ÔEthnic entrepreneurial labouringÕ also requires paying attention to 
the fact that there are multiple British audiences and hence pitching the story 
effectively, to the appropriate audience. For example: 
 
You have to judge whom to say what. Not all Brits are interested. Also 
sometimes I donÕt have the energy to explain all that, especially if I sense the 
person is not very political or interested. Political Brits are curious. So it is them 
I spend my energy explaining about Kurds. (Male, 37)  
                                                        
5
 Enrolling is more oriented towards the second generation of Kurds. Due to space limitations I focus 
my discussion on translations to the British. 
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I meet British people at school or at work. I have to judge whether or not it is 
worth talking to them at length about Kurds. I will always make a point of 
mentioning that I am a Kurd from Turkey but I only tell people [in greater 
detail] if I see that they can relate. (Female, 28) 
 
Neither finding the right person to talk to nor engaging in ethnic entrepreneurial 
labouring is easy. But ensuring that the Kurdish struggle and rebellion are rendered in 
a manner palatable for the British is an even bigger hurdle. Even though specific 
political steps were not outlined by my interviewees, their overall goal was to gain 
recognition of their Kurdish identity by the British authorities and the public. There 
was also hope that through such recognition and understanding, support for the Kurds 
in Britain and Europe would intensify pressures on Turkey, forcing it to take the 
necessary steps towards greater democratisation and increased recognition of Kurdish 
rights in Turkey. 
 
Some of my interviewees told me various strategies, and coping mechanisms they 
employed to achieve ÔpalatabilityÕ. Some highlighted that one needed to ÔmirrorÕ the 
British, that is ensure that the body language, the style of the communication, the 
mannerisms parallel those of the British. It was argued that adjusting these in line 
with British tastes and modes of communication eased the reception of the story 
Kurds were telling. One went as far as to say Ôotherwise we come across as too 
passionate and thus aggressiveÕ. Another coping strategy, which some of the brokers 
employed when making their case palatable, was to draw comparisons with injustices 
with which the British were already familiar or sympathised. For example, 
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comparisons with Northern Ireland, Scotland and Palestine were often drawn. Kurdish 
brokers said that they drew similarities between the trajectory of Abdullah calan 
(the imprisoned leader of the PKK) and Nelson Mandela, a leader admired by many, 
in order to Ôget the British on oneÕs sideÕ. This parallels the current European-wide 
Kurdish initiative which is campaigning for the release of Abdullah calan, 
comparing his imprisonment to that of Nelson Mandela. Effort was also spent on 
coalition-building with other diasporic groups, akin to the strategies which Arab-
Americans deploy (Nagel and Staeheli, 2005). 
 
Some of the Kurdish brokers I spoke to also stated that in their engagement with the 
British public and authorities they have made an attempt to move away from the use 
of critical and strong language towards Turkey. Their language has modified to 
become more reconciliatory and based around human rights discourse, one that the 
British could associate with more easily. It was, for example pointed out that if the 
struggle was too self-centred, or Turkey-oriented, it did not engage the British 
effectively: 
 
English people are intrigued because it is news to them. I donÕt think the first 
generation sold it [the struggle] that well to the English. The slogans we use [in 
demonstrations] are too much based on criticisms. We come across as too 
biased. Also we keep on saying Turkish state did this and that. We have to show 
them that it affects them [the British] too and that they have a stake in solving it. 
(Female, 25) 
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In demonstrations the banners we used to carry and the slogans we chanted even 
used to be in TurkishÐ we were just talking to ourselves. Then during a 
demonstration some of us who were brought up here in London started shouting 
slogans in English. We now use more English [in addition to Kurdish and 
Turkish]. (Male, 29)6  
 
As can be seen, diasporic battling and the associated translational activities then, 
require rendering the suffering and rebellion in a way which creates empathy and easy 
accessibility. Domesticating the struggle, taking out its foreignising elements, for 
example rendering it in a language and style the host community understands and 
appreciates, making it palatable and engaging to the non-Kurds of London all demand 
Ôethnic entrepreneurial labouringÕ. This labouring also requires that whilst the British 
are Ôgot on boardÕ one still remains loyal to the struggle (and oneself). In other words, 
a lot of labouring and fine-tuning are needed in order to strike the right balance 
between defending, translating and rendering the struggle correctly (and in a loyal 
way), and making it palatable and attractive for non-Kurds.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The suppression of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights in Turkey, and the relative 
ignorance of their host community (the UK) about the struggles of Kurds in Turkey 
make the cultural revival and translation in which Kurds engage all the more 
important. It arises from, and is enhanced by, the collective injustices Kurds have 
                                                        
6 Assimilation strategies and the suppression of the Kurdish language in Turkey mean that Turkish is 
not only used extensively by ordinary Kurds in London, but Ôsomewhat ironically, Turkish is often the 
common language of Kurdish political mobilizationÕ (Houston 2004, p. 412). 
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faced in their homeland, akin to the Ôvictim diasporasÕ discussed in Cohen (1997). As 
I tried to show in the chapter, this translation of Kurdish culture and struggle is 
central to the transnational battles of Kurds in Britain and across Europe. It allows the 
recovery and reconstruction of their culture and rebellion whilst simultaneously 
serving the transnational Kurdish audience and their fight for identity reconstitution.  
 
The chapter examined KurdsÕ ethno-national struggles in London by introducing the 
notion of Ôbattlespace diasporaÕ, an alternative political sphere diasporas create and 
maintain as they carry on their identity battles with their country of origin. 
Battlespace diaspora, as I argued, is a type of Ôdiaspora spaceÕ. The latter has been 
much discussed in the literature (e.g. Adamson, 2002; Brah, 1996; Mavroudi, 2008). I 
identified and described Ôbattlespace diasporaÕ as a political diasporic space where the 
mobilisation of ethno-political identity is intense and the disputes with the country of 
origin are buoyant, resilient and at times radical, and contextualised it within the 
dynamic and occasionally troubled relationship Kurds establish with their country of 
origin. 
 
Much work on the Kurdish diaspora has focused on Kurds' antagonistic relationship 
with Turkey, and KurdsÕ associated anti-Turkey mobilisation and activities. In this 
chapter, however, I attempted to extend our understanding of the types of battles in 
which diasporas engage by making the translational activities of Kurds in London as 
central. I turned attention to an aspect of their struggle which makes the British (rather 
than the Turkish state) its audience. By using the insights of translation studies, I 
discussed the ways in which new perspectives and avenues in diaspora studies could 
be opened up if translations that diasporas undertake are seen as sites and vehicles of 
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gain and discovery as well as erasure. I drew attention to the multiple audiences 
diasporas present themselves, hence challenging the singular understanding of Ôthe 
host communityÕ typically envisioned in diaspora studies. In addition, I examined 
translation through introducing new conceptual tools such as Ôethnic entrepreneurial 
labouringÕ, Ôethno-political tuitionÕ and ÔpalatabilityÕ. 
 
The chapter focused on the various strategies and coping mechanisms the Kurdish 
diaspora employ when ÔhomeÕ and ÔawayÕ are encountered through translations. As 
the data I presented showed, translating their struggle and rebellion to the British is 
perceived as essential for Kurdish brokers. It is through such translations and 
renderings that Kurds become transnational agents, making their identity battles 
dynamic and situated. The chapter also demonstrated that the translation of an ethno-
political identity in diaspora is not an easy task. It requires Kurds to engage in Ôethnic 
entrepreneurial labouringÕ and Ôethno-political tuitionÕ. It requires them to make the 
struggle ÔpalatableÕ for the British audiences. As such, the alternative political sphere 
they create, the battlespace diaspora, does not come easy; it requires much upkeep, 
labouring and maintenance.  
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